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A New Bio-cryptosystem-oriented Security
Analysis Framework and Implementation of
Multibiometric Cryptosystems Based on
Decision Level Fusion
Cai Li, Jiankun Hu, Josef Pieprzyk, Willy Susilo

Abstract—Biometric cryptosystems provide an innovative
solution for cryptographic key generation, encryption as well as
biometric template protection. Besides high authentication
accuracy, a good biometric cryptosystem is expected to protect
biometric templates effectively, which requires that helper data
does not reveal significant information about the templates.
Previous works predominantly follow an appropriate entropy
definition to measure the security of biometric cryptosystems.
In this paper, we point out limitations of entropy-based security
analysis and propose a new security analysis framework that
combines information-theoretic approach with computational
security. In addition, we construct a fingerprint-based
multibiometric cryptosystem using decision level fusion. Hash
functions are employed in our construction to further protect
each single biometric trait. The experimental results and
security analysis demonstrate that the proposed multibiometric
cryptosystem provides stronger security and better
authentication accuracy compared to a cryptosystem based on
single biometric.
Index
Terms—Biometric
cryptosystems,
min-entropy,
Shannon-entropy, authentication accuracy, template protection,
security.

I. INTRODUCTION
with traditional authentication techniques such as
Compared
passwords and token cards, biometric-based techniques
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offer a non-repudiable, more universal and reliable option for
individuals’ authentication. A typical biometric-based
authentication system is composed of two processes [1]: (1) the
enrollment process, in which the system scans a user’s
biometric image, creates a biometric template of biometric
features extracted from the image, and stores the template in
databases; and (2) the authentication process, in which the
system scans an individual’s biometric data, extracts biometric
features in the same manner and compares them with the
template of the user the individual claims to be. The system
will output a match if according to a pre-defined similarity
measure, a query is sufficiently similar to the template or a
mismatch if it is not.
However, widespread applications of biometrics have
brought about new security challenges. As biometric templates
are physically stored in databases or servers, raw images are
able to be reconstructed once the templates are compromised by
attackers [2]. Unlike traditional passwords or token cards,
which can be reset or reissued, compromised biometric data is
unlikely to be replaced due to the scarcity of biometric traits an
individual possesses, which means a permanent loss of the
chosen biometric features for authentication purposes. More
seriously, since a biometric template is likely to be used
repeatedly on different applications, a compromise of the
template will put all these applications at risk and may lead to a
great loss to the owner.
Over the past few years, there has been a great deal of work
on how to protect biometric templates. Basically, biometric
protection techniques use transformed data instead of original
biometric data or feature-based templates to authenticate users.
Proposed methods can be classified into two types: (1) feature
transformations (or cancelable biometrics) [3]-[6], and (2)
biometric cryptosystems [7]-[11]. The former applies
non-invertible transformations to modify original biometric
data. The transformed template is stored for matching. Once the
transformed template is compromised, the system can reissue a
new one using different transformation parameters. Biometric
cryptosystems provide an innovative solution for cryptographic
key generation, encryption as well as biometric template
protection. In biometric cryptosystems, original templates are
replaced by biometric-dependent information (referred to as
helper data), which assists in recovering cryptographic keys.
Matching is performed indirectly by verifying the validity of
recovered keys.

There exist two major criteria for judging the performance of
a biometric cryptosystem: accuracy and security. The accuracy
of biometric cryptosystems, similar to that of biometric
authentication systems, is also measured by False Acceptance
Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR). FAR is the
probability of an imposter being accepted as an authorized user,
while FRR is the probability of a legitimate user being rejected
as an imposter. The security of biometric cryptosystems
requires that helper data, once compromised by an attacker,
should not reveal significant information about original
biometric templates. A majority of papers in this field follows
the average min-entropy of original biometric templates given
helper data as a security metric [11]. However, Golic et al. [12]
point out that the average min-entropy does not measure the
statistical independence of random variables and introduced the
conditional Shannon entropy instead. It is noteworthy that both
the average min-entropy and the conditional Shannon entropy
measure the security from the information-theoretic
perspective, which merely reflects the probabilities rather than
the actual values of biometric templates. Therefore, they cannot
be completely equated with the security of biometric
cryptosystems,
especially
those
that
are
information-theoretically insecure but computationally secure.
Unfortunately, this issue has not aroused due attention from
researchers. What is worse, entropy measures are improperly
employed in the security analysis of some biometric
cryptosystems, especially in the case of fingerprint
cryptosystems.
Although biometric cryptosystems applying single biometric
(such as fingerprint, iris, face etc.) have been widely studied,
the accuracy and security of single biometric cryptosystems
(SBC) are limited, which leads to the theoretical work and
practical applications of multibiometric cryptosystems (MBC).
Compared to SBC, MBC offer higher authentication accuracy
and flexibility, wider population coverage and stronger
security. In general, MBC can be classified into two categories
based on different fusion modes: (1) fusion at the feature level
(also known as biometric level), and (2) fusion at the decision
level (also known as cryptographic level) [13]. The former
fuses biometric features from multiple sources into a single
template for identification and verification. The latter performs
authentication in each SBC separately and outputs final
decisions based on specific rules (such as n out of k rule based
fusion). Fu et al. [13] provide the theoretical accuracy analysis
of MBCF (multibiometric cryptosystems based on feature level
fusion) and MBCD (multibiometric cryptosystems based on
decision level fusion). They conclude that both MBCF and
MBCD (MN-split mode) have higher authentication accuracy
(lower FAR and lower FRR) than SBC. However, we find their
analysis is flawed and therefore reanalyze the accuracy of MBC.
From our results, the accuracy of both MBCF and MBCD
(MN-split mode) is not theoretically better than that of
corresponding SBC but influenced by several practical factors,
such as selected biometric traits, fusion algorithms, decision
rules, etc.
Compared with MBCD, MBCF are more frequently
proposed and studied in recent years since they can provide
higher recognition accuracy as well as stronger security for
single biometric templates [1], [14]-[16]. Sutcu et al. [1] design
a combined template of fingerprint and face, and apply

Pinsketch [11] for template protection. Nandakumar and Jain
[15] adopt fuzzy vault to conceal a template fusing fingerprint
and iris features among a host of chaff points. Camlikaya et al.
[16] provide a template protection scheme by hiding fingerprint
features among voice. However, as feature fusion transforms
features from different biometric sources into the same
universe, concatenation of these features can be arduous due to
the inconsistency of different biometrics traits. Besides, the
extendibility of MBCF is poor and may lead to the
curse-of-dimensionality
problem
[17].
In
contrast,
implementation of MBCD avoids the difficulty of biometric
feature unification and is more flexible in terms of choosing
biometric sources and their corresponding cryptosystem
constructions. These advantages motivate us to construct a
practical MBCD.
This paper mainly consists of two parts: a new
bio-cryptosystem-oriented security analysis framework and a
practical fingerprint-based MBCD construction. Our work
makes the following contributions. It
1. investigates the relations among different entropy
measures and system security in depth under two
common scenarios,
2. revisits the entropy-based security analysis of some
popular fingerprint-based cryptosystems and points out
the limitation of entropy for measuring the security of
biometric cryptosystems,
3. proposes a new security analysis framework, which
merges information-theoretic and computational
security,
4. revisits the analysis of the authentication accuracy of
MBCF and MBCD,
5. constructs a practical MBCD using fingerprints from
multiple fingers of individuals.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Some
preliminaries are presented in Section II, including basic
concepts and terms used in the work. Section III concentrates
on analyzing the correspondence between widely-applied
entropy measures and systems security. In Section IV, we
reanalyze the entropy-based security of several well-known
fingerprint-related cryptosystems. A new security analysis
framework for biometric cryptosystems is proposed in
Section V. Section VI is dedicated to the accuracy analysis of
MBC from a theoretical perspective, and a practical
fingerprint-based MBCD construction is proposed in Section
VII. Conclusions are given in Section VIII.
II. PRELIMINARY
A. Biometric Cryptosystems
Generally, based on how helper data is derived, biometric
cryptosystems can be classified into two categories:
key-binding systems and key generating systems [18]-[22].
1) Key-binding systems
Helper data is obtained by binding a chosen cryptographic
key
with a biometric
template.
During the
matching/authentication process, the system attempts to
recover the cryptographic key from the helper data using a
biometric query (see Figure 1). The design of a key-binding
biometric cryptosystem should always ensure that the key
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can be successfully recovered with overwhelming
probability if the query is from a legitimate user.
2) Key generating systems
Helper data is derived only from the biometric template
and the cryptographic key is generated from the helper data
and the biometric query. If the template and query are from
the same user, then the generated keys will be the same with
overwhelming probability. Key generating systems are also
referred to as “fuzzy extractor” or “secure sketch” (see
Figure 2), both of which are formally-defined in [11]. In
general, a fuzzy extractor is composed of a secure sketch and
a strong extractor. The secure sketch uses helper data to
recover original biometric templates while the strong
extractor generates nearly uniform random keys from
biometric data.
B. Metric Spaces ( M )
Dodis et al. [11] define three metric spaces: Hamming
metric, set difference metric and edit metric. The majority of
biometric data falls into the first two metric spaces because a
biometric template can always be represented as either a binary
string or a set of features.
They also define distance functions in each metric space to
measure the difference between the template and query.
Definitions of Hamming distance and set distance are given as
follows.
1) Hamming distance. Here M F n for some alphabet F

F n , the distance between them, denoted by

. For x, x

dis( x, x ) , is the number of positions in which the
strings x and x differ.
2) Set difference distance. Here M consists of all subsets of
a universe U and | U | n . For x, x M ,
dis( x, x )

x

x

2x x .

C. Widely-Used Biometric Cryptosystem Constructions
There are many constructions of biometric cryptosystems,
among which fuzzy commitment, fuzzy vault and Pinsketch are
most popular. Brief descriptions of them are given below. For
more details, please refer to [9]-[11].
1) Fuzzy Commitment (Hamming Metric) [9]
This construction is made up of two algorithms:
commitment and decommitment. To commit a template x
that can be expressed by an n-bit string, the system selects a
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Fig. 1. The framework of key-binding systems

K

X

Key

Randomness

K

(b)
Fig.2. The frameworks of (a) a secure sketch and (b) a fuzzy extractor

random codeword c and sets   c  x . Then
F (c, x)  (h(c), ) is stored in the system as a commitment,
where h is a hash (or one-way) function [9]. To decommit a
query x  , x   is calculated and mapped to the nearest
codeword c  , the decommitment is successful if
h(c ) h(c) . For codewords with the minimum distance d ,
the decommitment can always succeed as long as
dis( x, x)  t , where t   d 2 .
2)

Fuzzy Vault (Set Difference Metric) [10]
With a template that can be expressed by a set of biometric
features: x  {x1 , x2 ,.......xs } U s and a cryptographic key

k  k0 k1k2 ...km1 U m satisfying m  s , a polynomial
p( x)  km1 xm1  km2 x m2  ...  k1 x  k0 is constructed and
evaluated at each point in x to generate a genuine set
{xi , p( xi )}is1 . Then a chaff point set {xi , yi }ir s 1 is generated,
where xi {x1 , x2 ......xi 1} and yi  p( xi ) . {xi , p( xi )}is1 and

{xi , yi }ir s 1 compose a vault v  {xi , p( xi )}is1 {xi , yi }ir s 1
(helper data). It is commonly known that a polynomial of
degree m  1 can be uniquely determined by m pairs of points,
so if a query x  overlaps with x significantly, the polynomial
p can be reconstructed. Further, both the key and template
can be retrieved as well.
3) Pinsketch (Set Difference Metric) [11]
Pinsketch is a syndrome-based construction designed to
deal with set difference. With a template x  {x1 , x2 ,.......xs } ,
the system generates helper data as
SS ( x) syn( x) (s1 , s3 ,...s2t 3, s2t 1 ) ,
s

x j i and t is the error tolerance. When a query

where si
j 1

x {x1 , x2 ,.......xs } is presented, the sketch generates the
syndrome of x as
syn( x ) (s1 , s3 ,...s2t
and retrieves the template x by

3

, s2t

1

),

Rec( x , SS ( x))

2)

supp(v) x ,

supp(v) x
supp(v) x supp(v) x
and
supp(v) denotes the positions in which v is nonzero, which
can be computed through the syndrome of v :
where

The

syn(v) (s1 s1 , s3 s3 ,...s2t 1 s2t 1 )
construction guarantees that if dis( x, x)  t ,

Rec( x , SS ( x))

x.

D. Security of biometric cryptosystems
In biometric cryptosystems, physically-stored helper data is
always assumed public to attackers and the security has been
put into precise mathematical terms by defining the amount of
information by appropriate entropy measures. Most papers in
this field [1], [11], [15] have been following the average
min-entropy of original biometric templates X given helper
data Y , i.e., H ( X | Y ) , while some of them [12], [13], [23]
use the conditional Shannon entropy, H ( X | Y ) . The entropy
measures used in the paper are listed below.
(1)
H (X )
log max x Pr( X x)
H(X )

Pr( X

x) log Pr( X

Multiple-guessing until success—toss the dice and let
the player guess. If the player succeeds, game stops.
Otherwise, the player is given another chance until he
succeeds (no re-dicing). How many trials are expected
to guess the value of X ?
For convenience, we denote the expected number of
guessing trials under one-step guessing and that under multipleguessing scenarios by ETO and ETM , respectively. Theorem 1
characterizes the relation between the entropy and the number
of guessing trials under each scenario.
Theorem 1: Suppose a random variable X distributes over
U {u1 , u2 ,...un } and {Pr( X u i ) pi , p1 p2 ... pn } , then
n

we

have

log(E y

Y [max x

log( E y

Y2

H(X | Y)

Pr(Y

Pr( X

H ( X | y)

x |Y

y )])

y)

ETO

y Y

x))i 1 max x Pr( X

(1 max x Pr( X

,and

x)i

i 1

1 / max x Pr( X

(3)
(4)

ipi

ETO
n 2
n
ETM
.
2
2
2 ETO
Proof: The best strategy for one-step guessing is to guess the
most likely value every time. Hence we get

)

y )H ( X | Y

ETM

,

1
2

x X

H (X | Y)

(X )

i 1

(2)

x)

2H

ETO

2

log max x Pr( X

2

log p1

2H

x)
x)

(X )

In terms of multiple-guessing, the best strategy is to guess
the values of X in decreasing order of probability, so we have
n

III. ENTROPY AND SECURITY

ETM

It is a well-established fact that entropy reflects the amount
of information. However, entropy is also very useful to
characterize security of a system. When we analyze security,
we often ask about how difficult it is to obtain secrets (such as
passwords, private keys, biometric traits, etc.) by an attacker. A
typical strategy of the attacker is to try to guess a secret. There
are two possible scenarios that the attacker can apply [12]: (1)
one-step guessing until success, and (2) multiple-guessing until
success. In the first scenario, the attacker aims to guess one
secret from a large collection of secrets. To be more specific,
the attacker makes a guess and then browses the collection of
secrets until a match is found. In the second scenario, the
attacker targets a specific secret and keeps guessing until
success. The two scenarios are illustrated below with an
example of dicing game.
Dicing Game: Suppose there is an n-sided (label number
1~n) loader dice. The number of the side facing upwards X

n

Since np1

i)

pi ,

pi

ETO , X is uniformly distributed over U and

n

n

ETM

n

ipi
i 1

i

i
n
1

1

n

1
2

2

ETO
2

ETO
2

1
2

p2

ETO , ETM approximates to the minimum value when
p3 p4 ... p 1/ p1
p1 , p 1/ p1 1 1 p1 1 / p1 and

p1/ p1

2 , p1/ p1 3 ,... pn

If n

when p2
have

0 , and reaches the maximum value

p3

pn

(1

p1 ) / (n 1) . Therefore, we

n

ETM

ipi
i 1

1} , which is

i 1

known by a player.
Now let us consider guessing the value of X in two different
scenarios:
1) One-step guessing until success—toss the dice and let
the player guess. If the player succeeds, game stops.
Otherwise, repeat dicing and guessing until the player
succeeds. How many trials are expected to guess the
value of X ?

1 , we can deduce n  1/ p1  ETO . If

pi
i 1

n

follows a distribution: {Pr( X

ipi
i 1

And

p1

1
1
p1

1

1
p1

1
2

ETO
2

1
p1
/2

/2

1

p1

1
p1

1

1
p1

n

ETM

ipi

p1

i 1

1
ETO

n

(1 p1 ) (n
n 1

(1 1 / ETO )(n
2

2

2)(n 1)
2
2)

n
2 ETO

2

ETO
1
n 2
n
ETM
.
2
2
2
2 ETO
According to Theorem 1, min-entropy H  ( X ) depends on
the maximum probability of a random variable, and reflects
ETO very well. H ( X ) measures ETM to some extent [24] as
both of them are influenced by the overall distribution (the
more uniform the distribution is, the higher they are, and vice
versa.). As far as biometric cryptosystems are concerned,
helper data Y is stored in databases or servers instead of a
biometric template X . Therefore, one-step guessing and
multiple-guessing trials about the template are reflected by
H ( X | Y ) and H ( X | Y ) , respectively (assume Y is given).
Therefore,

IV. ENTROPY ANALYSIS OF FINGERPRINT-BASED BIOMETRIC
CRYPTOSYSTEMS
It is assumed that for secure biometric cryptosystems, their
helper data does not reveal too much information about original
biometric templates. Consequently, they must retain high
average min-entropy/conditional Shannon entropy. However, it
has been found that the template entropy given helper data
highly interacts with authentication accuracy. Buhan et al. [25]
show that there is a relation between the template entropy given
the helper data and the error rates of a biometric cryptosystem,
which is defined as H ( X | y)   log FAR . Dodis et al. [11]
give the upper bound of the average min-entropy H ( X | Y )
of a secure sketch—when X is uniformly distributed over M ,
H  ( X | Y )  log K (M , t ) , where K (M , t ) is the largest K for
which there exists an (M , K , t ) code (An (M , K , t ) code is a
subset {c1 , c2 ,...cM } of K elements of M that can correct up to
t errors. More details can be found in [11]). For a q-ary block
n (i.e. M  Qn , Q  q
code C of
length
),
n
K ( M , t )  q    (q  1)i , which is called the Hamming
i 0  i 
bound, and we call C perfect if and only if it attains the
Hamming bound. Obviously, the upper bound of entropy-based
security is maximized when perfect codes are applied, but in
real applications, error-correcting codes cannot always achieve
the Hamming bound, e.g., it is impossible to construct a 6-bit
perfect code which can correct up to 2-bit errors, so the
entropy-based security of real systems may vary depending on
different-sized error correcting codes used [26]. According to
their work, it can be observed that the upper bound of template
entropy given helper data depends on the error tolerance levels
allowed during authentication. In particular, if the error
tolerance level of a biometric cryptosystem is large, then the
corresponding template entropy given helper data will be low
t

n

as both K (M , t ) and FAR 1 are small, and vice versa. Therefore,
it is unlikely that biometric traits suffering from high intra-class
variation, such as fingerprints, can be applied to construct
biometric cryptosystems which perform well in both
authentication accuracy and entropy-based security. However,
this issue has not gained deserved attention from experts
specializing in fingerprint recognition. On one hand, they claim
that their proposed fingerprint-based bio-cryptosystems are of
high recognition accuracy (low FAR and FRR). On the other
hand, they recommend these systems by demonstrating good
entropy-based security. In this paper, we argue that some
assumptions they make when analyzing entropy-based security
are not well founded, which have produced confusing analysis
results.
A number of fingerprint-based cryptosystems adopt fuzzy
vault [10], which is proposed by Juels and Sudan for key
encryption purpose. According to Juels and Sudan’s analysis,
suppose a fuzzy vault is made up of a biometric template
,
an
encoding
polynomial
x Us
m 1
m 2
p( x) keym 1x
keym 2 x
... key0 , and a vault v of size r ,
r
then there are roughly | U |m s
distinct polynomial
s
candidates

p

p that are able to produce v , i.e.,

r
H  ( P | V )  log(| U |m  s    1) ( p  is interpolated by exactly
s
s points in v ) . Admittedly, the entropy-based security of fuzzy
vault is high when m approximates s and the number of chaff
points is large enough. However, with the increase of m , the
error tolerance decreases, while excessive chaff points will
consume much computer storage. Therefore, ideal parameters
are unachievable in practice.
The polynomial reconstruction in fuzzy vault [10] is a special
case of Reed-Solomon list decoding problem, and the best
choice for decoding is generally the classical algorithm of
Peterson-Berlekamp-Massey [27]-[29]. However, this
algorithm takes the majority opinion among all possible
solutions, and can tolerate only up to s  m errors, which means
the valid polynomial p can be found only when the number of
discrepancies in the biometric data

x  x is less than

(s  m) / 2 . As is widely known, fingerprint data has large
intra-class variability—fingerprint traits from the same user
captured by different devices or at different time may vary
significantly. Therefore, if Reed-Solomon decoding is directly
used in fingerprint-based cryptosystems, it will result in many
false rejects for genuine users [14].
To overcome this limitation, Nandakumar et al. [18] apply
CRC (cyclic redundancy check) to fuzzy vault to help identify
the correct polynomial from a set of candidates, thus improving
the error tolerance up to 2(s m) . In their construction, the
biometric features in the template are minutia attributes, which
are represented as 16-bit binary strings, while s , m and r are set
to 24, 9 and 224, respectively, for the best recognition
performance. According to their parameters, we can roughly
evaluate the number of polynomial candidates p  given a vault

224
224
/ 1072 0 . That is to say,
24
24
the only polynomial that can produce v is p itself.

v , which is (216 )

15

Consequently, we can deduce H ( K | V )

0 and further

H ( X | V ) 0 because x and k are bijective given v . They
apply the same construction to multibiometric templates
(fingerprint-iris) based on feature level fusion [15], and claim
that the entropy-based security of the new vault could reach up
to 49 bits (They assume the genuine and chaff points are
uniformly distributed, thus concluding the entropy security
corresponds to the security in the brute-force attack scenario).
However, we find the assumption and conclusion unjustified.
Even if all genuine and chaff points are distributed uniformly,
the values of the encoding polynomial at genuine points, p(x) ,
are not uniform. To be more precise, not all the polynomials of
degree m  1 constructed by interpolating m unique pairs of
points from the vault can be the encoding polynomial as the
valid polynomial should satisfy the condition that there are
exactly s pairs of points in the vault falling on it. In fact, with
the parameters they gave ( s 84, m 14, r 884 ), we can
calculate
the
actual
average
min-entropy
16 70 884
H ( X | V ) log((2 )
1) 0 . This misleading
84
entropy analysis is also adopted in [26].
Some other fingerprint-based cryptosystems require
verification information, such as hash values to assist key
recovery, but extra entropy loss is often neglected. Here, we
take hash functions for example to help understand how hash
values reduce entropy. Given any k-bit hash value
y hash( x j ), x j X , X
n , the expected number of
xi X , i
j being able to produce y can be expressed as:
n 1

N

i
i 1

n 1
i

2

ki

(1 2 k )n

i 1

(n 1) / 2k ,

Therefore, we can deduce H ( X | Y ) log(1 (n 1) / 2k ) .
When H ( X ) log n ( X is uniformly distributed), the
entropy loss due to revealing hash values can be computed as:
2k n
. For a fixed n , the
H ( X ) H ( X | Y ) log k
2
n 1
entropy loss rises with the increase of the length of hash values,
and the corresponding average min-entropy declines. Liu et al.
[30] propose a fingerprint-based key-binding biometric
cryptosystem which consists of three levels of secure sketch.
The first two: wrap-round and Pinsketch, which deal with
random errors and burst errors respectively, are essentially a
type of soft two-level construction while the third level is a
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme. The output of the three levels
of secure sketch, denoted by {i }iN1 ,{ i }iN1 ,{ Ai }iN1 ,( A0 , SC0 ) ,
are stored explicitly for key recovery. Nevertheless, since
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme itself cannot identify the
validity of recovered local structures, besides the three levels of
sketch data, a collection of hash values of minutia structures,
{h(SCi )}iN1 , are required to be stored extra for verification
purposes. For the sake of convenience, we denote the sum of

the sketch data and the collection of hash values by
Y  {i }iN1 ,{ i }iN1 ,{Ai }iN1 , ( A0 , SC0 ),{h(SCi )}iN1 . Although
the authors have shown the security of the system in two
respects: Pinsketch security and hash security, the rigorous
entropy-based security analysis of the overall system is not
given. Actually, as they adopt SHA256 to encrypt each minutia
structure, which is represented by a 108-bit binary string SCi (
n 5 ), based on the previous deduction, the remaining
entropy of SCi due to revealing h(SCi ) can be computed as:

H (SCi | h(SCi ))

log(1 (2108

1) / 2256 )

0 . Further, we

can deduce H ( NSi | h(SCi ), i )  H  ( NSi | SCi , i )  0 since
NSi (raw biometric feature vector) is uniquely determined by

SCi and i . The result can be extended to the entire system as:

H ({NSi }iN 1 | Y ) H ({NSi }iN 1 | {h(SCi )}iN 1 ,{ i }iN 1 ) 0 (Readers
can look into [30] for details about the construction and the
meanings of the symbols). Yang et al. [19] propose an
alignment-free fingerprint bio-cryptosystem based on modified
Voronoi neighbor structures, in which the authors apply a
two-level secure sketch (Pinsketch plus fuzzy vault) to tolerate
errors as well as protect fingerprint templates. They claim that
the entropy of their construction can reach 112 bits even if the
Pinsketch is compromised by attackers. Nevertheless, similar to
Liu et al.’s, their scheme also requires to store hash values of
local structures for key recovery, which should be considered
as a part of the helper data that may leak information about the
templates. If we assume that SHA256 is adopted, their scheme
has weak entropy-based security as well, i.e.,
H ( X i | Yi ) log(1 (28*14 1) / 2256 ) 0 , where X i and Yi
are the binary representations of the ith local structure and its
hash value, respectively. Admittedly, shorter hash values may
decrease the entropy loss, but it meanwhile results in the
degradation of authentication accuracy as more collisions
occur.
V. A NEW SECURITY ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK FOR BIOMETRIC
CRYPTOSYSTEMS
Considering the low entropy (approximate to 0) of the above
biometric cryptosystems, can we conclude that they are all
insecure? The answer is no. As a matter of fact, entropy
measures only reflect the information-theoretic security of a
system, which assumes the attacker has unlimited computing
power. Particularly, in biometric cryptosystems, entropy
measures the guessing trials under the condition that given
helper data, the possible corresponding values of biometric
templates and their probabilities are known, ignoring the
difficulty of deriving these values from the helper data.
Admittedly, entropy is significant in measuring the amount of
information and uncertainty. Besides biometric cryptosystems,
entropy measures are also widely employed in many other
security applications, especially network traffic analysis
[31][32]. However, all attackers in practice are computationally
limited. In this case, to measure the security of biometric
cryptosystems more comprehensively, we should also consider
the computational hardness of the derivation of biometric
templates from helper data (referred to as computational
security) besides related entropy. The current state of

knowledge has implied the decoding of Reed-Solomon codes,
also known as the polynomial reconstruction, as a
cryptographically hard problem when s
rm [33], [34]. Also,
a good cryptographic hash function is always pre-image
resistant, which means it is computationally difficult to get
original messages given hash values. Therefore, even though
the biometric cryptosystems listed above have no
information-theoretic security, they are still computational
secure.
There are some works in the literature dealing with
computational security of bio-cryptosystems [14], [18].
However, the analysis is merely conducted on specific systems
with known parameters rather than on general constructions.
Also, the previous work considers either entropy-based security
or computational security, while there are some cases in which
entropy-based and computational security coexist. For instance,
in some cryptographic scenarios that involve highly classified
information, users concern more about FAR than FRR. That is,
the systems target minimizing FAR to ensure that only valid
users have access to the information. If a fingerprint-based
fuzzy vault is applied, then it is supposed to only accept
fingerprint queries that have high similarity to templates, which
means a high value will be assigned to the degree of the
polynomial m . As a result, the entropy will increase. To be
more precise, if U  216 and s, m, r are assigned 24, 20 and

attacker has to perform decoding first to obtain x from y and
then conducts guess trials. If each guess trial is considered to be
an elementary operation, then we can expect that the average
number of elementary operations for success guess is
N ( F ( y))  2H ( X | y ) . By replacing guessing trials with
elementary operations for security measurement, we rewrite the
H ( X | y)  log 2H ( X | y )
security
metric
from
to

224,

SO ( X | Y )   log Ey Y ( N ( F ( y))  1) 1 .
In the multiple-guessing scenario, the case becomes more
complicated as the attacker can perform multiple guessing trials
that are inter-dependent. In particular, given y  F ( x) , the
attacker performs the decoding algorithm F  to get a value
x1  X such that F ( x1 )  y . If x1  x , the attacker succeeds and
stops decoding, or he continues decoding to obtain the next
value of X ( x2 ) that may produce y until he succeeds. If we
assume the attacker succeeds at the ith guessing trial and denote
the average number of elementary operations he conducts for
decoding so far by N ( F (i, y)) , then the average number of
elementary operations of recovering X given y is

respectively,
the
entropy
will
become
224


log((216 )20  24 
  1)  42.5 . Under this circumstance, the
 24 
fuzzy vault construction has both entropy-based security and
computational security as it is still time-consuming to search
for 20-degree polynomials interpolated by 24 points in the
vault. Considering the lack of a general security framework for
bio-cryptosystems and the inability of conventional security
analysis methodology in handling the above scenario, in this
section, we propose a novel bio-cryptosystem-oriented security
analysis
framework,
which
jointly
considers
information-theoretic and computational security.
Without loss of generality, we consider a generalized
biometric cryptosystem, which takes a biometric template
x  X and generates helper data by y  F ( x) , where F is an
encoding algorithm. Given y , the decoding algorithm that finds
out a value x  X such that F ( x )

y is denoted by F ( y)

y ) and the average number of elementary
operations of F  is represented by N ( F ( y)) . The security
analysis is given below under one-step guessing scenario and
multiple-guessing scenario, respectively (For reasons of
simplicity, we assume H ( X | y) H ( X | y) , which means
X is uniformly distributed over all values that may produce y ).
Apparently, if x is public to the attacker ( N ( F ( y))  0 ),
under one-step guessing scenario, he can hold the value to
browse a collection of the same systems and will succeed by
average 2H ( X | y ) guessing trials, and that is what min-entropy
measures. However, in practical applications, the correlation
between x and y is not always transparent, which means the

SO ( X | y)  log( N ( F ( y))  2H ( X | y ) ) . Correspondingly, we
give the new security metric of the whole system under
one-step guessing as follows.
Definition 1. Under one-step guessing scenario, the security
of a biometric cryptosystem considering computational
security can be measured by:
SO ( X | Y )   log( Ey Y 2 SO ( X | y ) )   log( Ey Y 2 log( N ( F ( y ))  2
1)

If for any yi , y j  Y , i  j , H  ( X | yi )  H  ( X | y j ) and

N ( F ( yi ))  N (F ( y j ))  N (F ) ,
2)

SO ( X | Y )  log( N ( F )  2H ( X |Y ) ) .
If N ( F ( y))  0 for any y  Y ,
SO ( X | Y )  H  ( X | Y ) .

3)

If H  ( X | Y )  0 ,

ny

 (Pr( x

i

i 1

| y)( N ( F (i, y))  i)) , where n y represents the number
ny

of the values of X being able to generate y , and

( F ( F ( y))



H ( X | y )

Pr( xi | y )i
i 1

denotes the expected number of guessing trials. Since X is
uniformly distributed over these n y values, we can deduce

Pr( xi | y)
2

into

1 / ny

2

H ( X | y)

and then rewrite the expression

H ( X |y )



(2 H ( X | y ) ( N ( F (i, y))  i)) , where N ( F (i, y)) also

i 1

equals the average number of elementary operations the
attacker needs to carry out to find i values from X that can
produce y . Accordingly, the new security metric of the whole
construction under multiple-guessing can be given as follows.
Definition 2. Under multiple-guessing scenario, the security
of a biometric cryptosystem considering computational
security can be measured by:

)

)

SM ( X | Y )  log E y Y

2H ( X | y )



2 H ( X | y ) ( N ( F (i, y))  i)

i 1

2H ( X | y )

log E y

Y

2

H ( X | y)

N ( F (i, y ))

(1

2H ( X | y ) ) / 2

i 1

1)

If N ( F (i, y))  0 for any y  Y ,
SM ( X | Y )  log E y Y

2H ( X | y )


i 1

2 H ( X | y ) i  log E y Y ETM , y .

Considering the similarity between ETM , y and conditional
Shannon entropy H ( X | y) (see section III), SM ( X | Y )
2)

can be measured by H ( X | Y ) to some extent in this case.
If H ( X | Y )  0 , SM ( X | Y )  log Ey Y ( N ( F (1, y))  1)

 log Ey Y ( N ( F ( y))  1) .
From the new security analysis framework, it can be
observed that the security of biometric cryptosystems is not
only determined by the related entropy, but also influenced by
the computational hardness of the decoding algorithm of each
construction. In consequence, it is inappropriate to conclude
that a fuzzy commitment of high entropy is more secure than a
fuzzy vault of low entropy considering the decoding of the
former is a simple XOR operator while that of the latter
involves polynomial reconstruction, a much more complicated
problem. As entropy (information-theoretic security) depends
on the error tolerance of applied biometric, which is
biologically determined and sometimes difficult to change
artificially even by adopting different authentication algorithms
[18], [19], [30], [35], to further improve the security of
biometric cryptosystems, efficient, hard-inverse encoding
algorithms can be employed when computational cost and time
for encoding are relatively negligible.
VI. ACCURACY ANALYSIS OF MBC
Compared
with
single
biometric
cryptosystems,
multibiometric cryptosystems can offer higher authentication
accuracy and security, as well as larger population coverage.
Therefore, they have been frequently studied in recent years.
Based on previous work, Fu et al. [13] formulate the formal
definition of MBC at two fusion levels: feature level (MBCF)
and decision level (MBCD). To be more precise, the latter can
be further divided into three sub-models: MN-split model ( n
out of k fusion rule), non-split model (OR rule) and package
model (And rule). Fusion at feature level is a map
FB : U b1 U b2  ... U bm  U b , which transforms features from
different biometric sources into the same universe and
constructs a united template xT  U b . Then xT will be bound
with a cryptographic key k and generate helper data. During the
authentication process, if a query xQ  U b satisfies

dis( xT , xQ )  t , both xT and k can be recovered. In a MBCD, a
cryptographic key is bound with a biometric template set
{xT ,i }im 1 , xT ,i U bi consisting of templates from different
biometric sources, and the recovery will succeed if at least n
biometrics from a query set {xQ,i }im 1 , xQ,i U bi and their

counterparts in the template set satisfy disi ( xT ,i , xQ,i )  ti , where

ti is the error tolerance of the ith biometric.
Fu et al. [13] analyze both MBCF and MBCD theoretically
in terms of security, privacy and accuracy. Although they
conclude that both MBCF and MBCD (MN-split model) have
lower FAR and FRR than SBC, we find there are theoretical
flaws in their analysis.
Now let us consider the accuracy of MBCF. If we denote the
query from the imposter and the legitimate user by xIM and xLE ,
respectively, the FAR and FRR of a MBCF can be expressed
as:
FARMBCF  Pr(dis( xT , xIM )  t )
FRRMBCF  Pr(dis( xT , xLE )  t ) ,
The accuracy improvement over the ith SBC can be computed
by:
FARreduction  FARSBCi  FARMBCF

 Pr(dis( xT ,i , xIM ,i )  ti )  Pr(dis( xT , xIM )  t )
 Pr(dis( xT ,i , xIM ,i )  ti & dis( xT , xIM )  t )
 Pr(dis( xT ,i , xIM ,i )  ti & dis( xT , xIM )  t )
FRRreduction  FRRSBCi  FRRMBCF

 Pr(dis( xT ,i , xLE ,i )  ti )  Pr(dis( xT , xLE )  t )
 Pr(dis( xT ,i , xLE ,i )  ti & dis( xT , xLE )  t )
 Pr(dis( xT ,i , xLE ,i )  ti & dis( xT , xLE )  t )
According to the above equations, it is not theoretically
guaranteed that the first probability on the right-hand exceeds
the second one. Whether or not MBCF have higher
authentication accuracy than SBC depends on the selected
biometric sources, fusion algorithms, the error tolerance t , etc.
As a matter of fact, inappropriate selection and concatenation
of different biometric traits can even degrade the accuracy of
the system.
In the case of MBCD, Fu et al. [13] express the FAR and
FRR of MN-split model as:
n

FARMBCD   FARSBCi
i 1

FRRMBCD 

m  n 1

 FRR
i 1

SBCi

,

and therefore they conclude that FARMBCD  FARSBCi and
FRRMBCD  FRRSBCi , i  1...n . However, their accuracy analysis

does not consider all the situations in which an imposter is
accepted by the system and a legitimate user is rejected. We
reanalyze the accuracy of MN-split model by Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. In a general construction of MN-split model, for
m
m biometrics X  { X i }i 1 , the cryptographic key can be
decrypted if at least n sub-keys are successfully decrypted by
their corresponding biometrics. We have
 m
 
m i

FARMBCD  



i  n j 1 k C ( m , i , j )

FARSBCk



lC ( m , i , j )

(1  FARSBCl )

FRRMBCD 

 m
 
i

m

m

  

i  m  n 1 j 1 k C ( m ,i , j )

FRRSBCk



lC ( m ,i , j )

(1  FRRSBCl ) ,

where C (m, i, j ) denotes the jth combination of selecting i
biometrics from m . In particular, if each biometric has the
same FAR and FRR, then we can get
m
 m
i
FARMBCD     FARSBC
(1  FARSBC )m i
i n  i 
 m
i
m i

  FRRSBC (1  FRRSBC )
i
i  m  n 1 

Proof: If an imposter attempts to recover the cryptographic
key, he/she must successfully decrypt at least n sub-keys
encrypted by the corresponding biometrics. Let FARMBCD,i be
FRRMBCD 

m

the probability that the imposter gets the key by decrypting i
sub-keys. Then we can calculate the FAR of MN-split model as
follows.
FARMBCD  FARMBCD, n  FARMBCD, n1  ...  FARMBCD, m
m

FARMBCD ,i
i n

Since these i sub-keys can be any i ones from m , FARMBCD,i
can be expressed as
m
i

FARMBCD ,i

FARSBCk
j 1 k C ( m ,i , j )

(1

FARSBCl ) ,

l C ( m ,i , j )

and therefore
 m
 
m i

FARMBCD  



i  n j 1 k C ( m , i , j )

FARSBCk



lC ( m , i , j )

(1  FARSBCl ) .

Similarly, if a legitimate user fails to decrypt the key, then it
means the biometrics he/she presents can only decrypt at most
n 1 sub-keys. In other words, he/she fails to decrypt at least
m n 1 sub-keys. Then the FRR of MN-split model can be
computed in the same manner.
FRRMBCD  FRRMBCD, m n1  FRRMBCD, m n 2  ...  FRRMBCD, m
FRRMBCD ,i
i m n 1



i 1

Similarly, the FAR and FRR of package model can be
computed by setting n  m .
m

FARMBCD =  FARSBCi  FARSBCi
i 1

 m
 
m i

FRRMBCD  

 m
 
i

  

i  m  n 1 j 1 k C ( m ,i , j )

FRRSBCk



lC ( m ,i , j )

(1  FRRSBCl ) ,

where FRRMBCD,i is the probability that the legitimate user fails
to decrypt i sub-keys.
If we set n  1 , then MN-split model becomes non-split
model, and the FAR and FRR can be calculated as:
 m
 
m i

FARMBCD  



i 1 j 1 k C ( m , i , j )
m

FARSBCk

 1   (1  FARSBCi )
i 1

 FARSBCi



lC ( m ,i , j )

FRRSBCk



lC ( m ,i , j )

(1  FRRSBCl )

m

 1   (1  FRRSBCi )
i 1

 FRRSBCi

According to Theorem 2, we cannot conclude that MBCD
(MN-split model) always have lower FAR and FRR than SBC.
A simple case in point is X  {X i }i31 , in which
FARSBC1  FRRSBC1  0.4 , FARSBC2  FRRSBC2  0.2 and

FARSBC3  FRRSBC3  0.1 . Obviously, if n is set to 1 or 3, the
MN-split model becomes non-split model or package model.
Accordingly, FARMBCD (n  1)  FRRMBCD (n  3)  0.568 and

FARMBCD (n  3)  FRRMBCD (n  1)  0.008 . When n is set to 2,
FARMBCD (n  2)  FRRMBCD (n  2)  0.124 . No matter which
value n takes, the corresponding MBCD does not provide lower
FAR and FRR simultaneously than the 3rd SBC. In general,
there are several factors that contribute to the accuracy of a
MBCD, including the accuracy (FAR and FRR) of each SBC,
the number of total biometrics m , and the threshold n .
Theorem 3 shows a special case in which the resultant MBCD
has lower FAR and FRR than the SBC composing it.
Theorem 3. (Major-vote-based [36], [37] MN-split model)
For m  2n  1  3 biometrics X  {X i }im1 , the cryptographic
key can be decrypted if at least n sub-keys are successfully
decrypted by corresponding biometrics. If
FARSBC1 FARSBC2 ... FARSBCm FARSBC 1 2

FRRSBC2 ...

FRRSBCm

FRRSBC

1 2,

then we have FARMBCD FARSBC and FRRMBCD FRRSBC .
Proof: Let us consider the probability that an imposter fails
to decrypt the key GRRMBCD (Genuine Reject Rate), which can
be expressed as
m
m
i
GRRMBCD
GRRSBC
(1 GRRSBC ) m i
i m n 1 i
2 n 1 2n  1


i
2 n 1 i
 
 GRRSBC (1  GRRSBC )
i 
i n 
As GRRSBC

(1  FARSBCl )



i 1 j 1 k C ( m , i , j )

FRRSBC1

m

m

FRRMBCD   FRRSBCi  FRRSBCi

1 FARSBC

1 2 , according to condorcet’s jury
theorem [38], [39], we can get GRRMBCD GRRSBC and
therefore FARMBCD FARSBC .
Similarly, the probability of a legitimate user successfully
recovering the key (Genuine Accept Rate) is
m
m
i
GARMBCD
GARSBC
(1 GARSBC )m i
i
i n

 ab

ma

d ca

d ab

 ca

mb
d bc

 bc

mc

Fig. 3. Delaunay triangulation of a fingerprint image.
Fig. 4. A triangle and corresponding local features.
2n 1

i n

As GARSBC

GARMBCD

1

2n

1

i
FRRSBC

GARSBC

i
GARSBC
(1 GARSBC )2 n

1 i

1 2 , we can conclude that
and therefore FRRMBCD FRRSBC .

VII. FINGERPRINT-BASED MBCD (MN-SPLIT MODEL)
Compared with MBCD, MBCF are stronger in terms of
protecting single biometric templates, thus being more studied
over the past few years [1], [14]-[16]. However, fusion at
feature level also leads to some issues in practical applications,
such as incompatibility of features from different biometric
traits, entropy loss for fusion and the curse-of-dimensionality
problem. In contrast, MBCD avoid the difficulty of biometric
feature unification and can retain the advantages of each
biometric and its corresponding cryptosystem construction.
Moreover, MBCD are more extensible and can better meet the
requirements of some scenarios [40] and applications. While Fu
et al. [13] theoretically analyze the template privacy, key
security and accuracy of MBCD, they do not propose a system
implementation.
In the section, we present a practical MBCD construction
based on MN-split model, which uses fingerprints from
multiple fingers to secure cryptographic keys. A
registration-free, Delaunay triangle-based matching algorithm
proposed by Yang et al. [41] is adopted, which avoids
authentication errors caused by inaccurate registration.
A. Delaunay Triangulation [41]
Triangulation is a process of dividing a region of space into
multiple smaller triangular regions. Suppose a fingerprint
image consists of n minutiae, which are denoted by

M  {mi }in1 . The process to establish the Delaunay
triangulation of M is composed of two steps, which are
illustrated with Figure 3. Firstly, a Voronoi diagram of the
minutiae set M is constructed, which partitions the whole
image into n regions such that all the points in the ith region

are closer to m i than to any other minutia. Secondly, given the
Voronoi diagram, we connect the minutiae in neighboring
Voronoi regions and form the Delaunay triangulation net.
B.

Features Extraction
We denote the ith triangle of a Delaunay triangulation net by
Ti  {ma , mb , mc }, mk k{a, b, c}  {xk , yk , k , tk } , where minutiae

ma , mb , mc are vertexes of the triangle, ( xk , yk ) is the
coordinates of the minutia mk ,  k is the orientation of its
associated edge, and tk {0,1} is the minutia type (0
corresponds to ridge ending while 1 corresponds to ridge
bifurcation). Unlike [41], we do not use minutia type in our
scheme due to its instability, so the feature vector of Ti is
expressed by
FVi  {dab , dbc , dca , ab , bc , ca }

dab  ( xa  xb )2  ( ya  yb )2
dbc  ( xb  xc )2  ( yb  yc )2
dca  ( xc  xa )2  ( yc  ya )2
 ya  yb 
  a
 xa  xb 

 ab  tan 1 

 yb  yc
 xb  xc

 bc  tan 1 


  b


 yc  ya 
  c
 xc  xa 
The triangle Ti and its features are demonstrated in Figure 4.
Suppose there are s triangles in the Delaunay triangulation
net, then the fingerprint image can be expressed by a set of
these s local feature vectors as SV  {FVi }is1 . In our
construction, to reduce matching processing time, we choose
the first 80 Delaunay triangles ( s  80 ) from the whole set in

 ca  tan 1 
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ascending order of the distance between them and the singular
point or the center of the fingerprint image. Both d and  are
quantized and represented as bit strings of length 4, so FVi can
be represented by a 24-bit binary string.
C.

Encryption
We use a two-level secure sketch to achieve error tolerance
in our construction. The encryption procedure is shown in
Figure 5 and the detailed steps are given below:
1) The first level encryption
Suppose the multibiometric template in our MBCD
consists of templates from m, 2 m 10 different fingers,
s
given the template of the jth finger SVT , j  {FVT , j ,i }i 1 , we

apply a hash function H1 (.) to each FVT , j ,i and form a
transformed template Trans(SVT , j )  {H1 ( FVT , j ,i )}i 1 . If the
s

length of H1 (.) is l , we can use fuzzy vault Vsub, j to bind the
transformed template Trans( SVT , j ) with a sub-key K sub, j of
length ld j bits. As the sub-keys will be used as the input of
the second level secure sketch, we set d j

d for all fingers
in our experiment to ensure all the sub-keys are of the same
length. In addition, we compute the hash value of K sub, j
( H 2 ( K sub, j ) ) for sub-key verification.
2)

The second level encryption
The second level encryption is essentially the Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme. Given a cryptographic key K
provided by the user, if we expect it to be decrypted
successfully when at least n sub-keys are decrypted, then we
can divide K into n segments k0 , k1 ,...kn 1 and encode them

kn 1 xn 1 kn 2 xn 2 ... k0 .
p x is evaluated at each sub-key K sub, j to generate a

into a polynomial p , i.e. p( x)

genuine set {Ksub, j , p( Ksub,. j )}mj 1 . In our construction,
however, we store the hash values instead of the sub-keys
themselves. Thus the output of the entire system which needs
to be stored explicitly (the helper data) consists of
{H 2 ( Ksub, j ), p( K sub,. j )}mj 1 and {Vsub, j }mj 1 .
D.

Decryption
The decryption procedure is shown in Figure 6 and the
detailed steps are explained in the following:
1) The first level decryption
Given the template of the jth finger from the query, we
apply Delaunay Triangulation, feature extraction and hash
function H1 in a row and get Tran(SVQ, j )  {H1 ( FVQ, j ,i )}is1 .
Then the sub-key is recovered (polynomial interpolation) by
pairing Tran(SVQ, j ) and the elements in Vsub, j . If the
recovered sub-key K rec, j satisfies H 2 ( Krec, j )  H 2 ( K sub, j ) ,

( Krec, j , p( Ksub, j )) will be added into the unlocking set.
Apparently, the sub-key K sub, j can always be decrypted from

Vsub, j as long as SVT , j and SVQ , j have at least d common
elements.

2) The second level decryption
If at least n sub-keys are decrypted from the first level
secure sketch—the size of the unlocking set is no less than n ,
the cryptographic key K can be decrypted.
E. Experimental Results
Our construction uses fingerprints from multiple fingers of
an individual to encrypt the cryptographic key. Unfortunately,
we cannot find any open, standard database to meet our
requirements. Therefore, we collected fingerprint images from
150 cooperative subjects with balanced demographic
characteristics including age, gender and nationality, using an
optical sensor (CROSSMATCH Verifier 300 LC2.0) in our lab
[42]. The subjects mainly consisted of students and staff in
three Australian educational institutions: UNSW@ADFA,
Deakin University and La Trobe University. The age
distribution was as follows: (a) between the ages of 18 and 25:
45%, (b) between the ages of 25 and 35; 45%, and (c) older than
35 years: 10%. The gender distribution was almost balanced
with only a 10% gap between females and males. In terms of
the nationality distribution, 45% subjects are Asians, 45% are
Indians or Bangladeshis, and the remaining 10% are
Caucasians. Each subject was asked to provide images of ten
fingers and we captured the image of each finger four times
under different distortion. This database has been released
publicly within a 3D fingerprint database package [43]. Note
that most existing multimodal databases are combining
biometric features from different persons. Such simulation
databases have ignored the mutual dependency of different
biometric features from the same person, which can produce
misleading performance results [44].
The standard FVC protocol is applied in our experiment. In
particular, each image from a finger of a subject is compared
with other 3 images from the same finger of the subject to
calculate FRR while the first image from a finger of a subject is
compared with the first image from the corresponding finger of
other subjects to calculate FAR. To avoid repeated comparison,
if image 1 as the template has been already compared with
image 2, then when image 2 is chosen as the template, it will
not be compared with image 1 again. Since there are 4 images
for each finger from 150 subjects, the total numbers of genuine
test and imposter test are ((4 3) / 2) 150 900 and

(149 1) 149 / 2 11175 , respectively.
Firstly, we test the matching accuracy of each finger using
the Delaunay triangle-based algorithm. The corresponding
FRR and FAR when d  9 are shown in Table I, from which we
can learn that single fingerprint cannot offer desirable
performance in terms of identifying genuine users—the right
thumb has the best FRR, which is still up to 7.44%. Then we
use Theorem 2 in Section VI to analyze the accuracy of MBCD
in two scenarios ( m 4 and m 10 ). The theoretical results
in Table II show that our MBCD can significantly lower FRR
without compromising much on FAR when n is properly
chosen, e.g., n  2 in both scenarios. To further justify our
theorem, we finally conduct experiments for these two
scenarios. In the scenario m  4 , two index and two fingers are
employed as the multibiometric template, the FRR/FAR of the

TABLE I
MATCHING PERFORMANCE ON EACH FINGER
FRR
0.0744
0.0744
0.1244
0.2244
0.3467
0.0900
0.1422
0.1367
0.2578
0.4044

FAR
0.0001
0.0003
0.0001
0.0000
0.0000
0.0017
0.0002
0.0001
0.0002
0.0000

TABLE II
MBCD PERFORMANCE THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
MBCD
n=1
n=2
n=3
n=4
n=5
n=6
n=7
n=8
n=9
n=10

m=4 (FRR/FAR)
0.0002/0.0007
0.0059/0.0000
0.0718/0.0000
0.3998/0.0000
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA

m=10(FRR/FAR)
0.0000/0.0027
0.0000/0.0000
0.0000/0.0000
0.0003/0.0000
0.0031/0.0000
0.0213/0.0000
0.0971/0.0000
0.3021/0.0000
0.6429/0/0000
0.9576/0.0000

proposed system when n 2 is 2.67%/0%, while the
counterpart in the other scenario is 0.67%/0%. The ROC curves
of the SBC (single fingerprint) and MBCD under both
scenarios are shown and compared in Figure 7. Overall, the
experimental results conform to the theoretical results in
spite of the small FRR/FAR gap arising from the
non-uniformity of experimental data.
F. Security Analysis
We analyze the security of our construction in two respects:
single fingerprint protection and cryptographic key protection,
under the condition that the helper data are compromised by the
attacker. Similar to other fingerprint-based cryptosystems, our
construction has no information-theoretic security either for
low FRR. In particular, if we set d 9 and | Vsub, j | 880 (the
number of chaff points is 10 times that of genuine points), the
average min-entropy of the first level secure sketch (fuzzy vault)
 880 
is H  ( SVT , j | Vsub, j )  log((224 )9 80 
  1)  0 . Therefore,
 80 
the strength of our construction in terms of single fingerprint
protection will degrade into the computational complexity
log( N ( F (Vsub, j )) 1) . Given a sub-vault Vsub, j , the
computational complexity to decrypt the fuzzy vault by brute
 880   80 
force attack [18] can be computed as: 
    3.6e+09 .
 9  9
In addition, even if the sub-vault is decoded, the security of the
template can still rely on the hash function. As each triangle is
represented by a 24-bit binary string in the proposed system, if
the attacker tries all 24-bit binary strings to find the pre-image
of a given hash value, he/she will need to conduct average
(1  224 ) / 2 hash operations, so the overall security now

10

10

FRR

Finger No
1 (right thumb)
2 (right index finger)
3 (right middle finger)
4 (right ring finger)
5 (right little finger)
6 (left thumb)
7 (left index finger)
8 (left middle finger)
9 (left ring finger)
10 (left little finger)
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10
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-6

10 -6
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10

-4

10

-3

10

-2

10

-1

FAR

Fig. 7. ROC curves comparison.

become log(3.6e+09 (1 224 ) *9 / 2 1) 32bits . It is
noteworthy that the security is evaluated by simply assuming
polynomial interpolation and hashing to be only one
elementary operation, while the real security can be much
higher as both of them involves multiple computational
elementary operations. By using different hash functions in
diverse applications, the proposed construction can also resist
the cross-matching attack.
As far as cryptographic key protection is concerned, the
attacker has to decode at least n sub-vaults. Therefore, the
computational security is log(min1 i C ( m, n) Ni 1) , where N i is
the average number of elementary operations of the ith
combination, which is generated by selecting n biometrics from
n

m ones, denoted by Ni

N ( F (Vsub, j )) . Apparently, N i is
j 1

roughly n times N ( F (Vsub, j )) , which is the average number of
elementary operations required to decrypt the cryptographic
key in the corresponding SBC.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Security and accuracy are two major factors influencing the
performance of a biometric cryptosystem. The majority of work
in this field uses average min-entropy or conditional Shannon
entropy as the security metric. However, in this paper, we point
out the limitation of entropy in measuring the security of
biometric cryptosystems, and correct the entropy-based
security analysis of some popular fingerprint-based
cryptosystems. Then we propose a new security analysis
framework, which jointly considers information-theoretic and
computational security, thus being able to measure the security
of biometric cryptosystems more comprehensively.
In terms of accuracy analysis, we reanalyze the accuracy of
MBCF and MBCD from the theoretical perspective. The results
show that better accuracy of MBC than SBC is not theoretically
guaranteed. As a matter of fact, whether or not MBCF or

MBCD can offer an improvement of accuracy over SBC
depends on several factors: selected biometric traits, fusion
algorithms, decision rules, etc. Finally, we propose a practical
MBCD construction, which uses fingerprints from multiple
fingers to encrypt the cryptographic key. The experimental
results and security analysis prove that the proposed
construction provides stronger security and better
authentication accuracy compared to the corresponding SBC.
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